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Abstract 
Japan, the world’s second largest economy, is experiencing the worst economic crisis since 
the Second World War and the government is attempting to avoid a return to the “lost 
decade” of the 1990s when it was stuck in a deflationary spiral. To fight back recession, the 
Bank of Japan has kept the interest rate to 0.1 %, even lower than Bank of England’s 0.5 %. 
Japan’s economy has grown only at an average of 1% annually since 1992. Equally, the 
country’s recovery of 2003-07 did not have any long term effect on the growth. 
In many respects Japan remains very unique among the developed countries. The country’s 
economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s has encouraged debate among the scholars to the 
significance of Japan’s economic past. It is widely seen as due to different model of 
development in areas such as industrial organisation, the role of the state, social institutions 
and history. Her appeal lies in the dramatic growth rates and economic transformation. Japan 
was first Asian country to break the western monopoly of modern industrialisation. Less than 
a generation ago, Japan was viewed an exemplary success story in terms of rapid economic 
growth and a model to be emulated by other developed and developing countries. Here I will 
argue that the Japanese economy suffers from severe problems that are not cyclical but 
structural in nature. Such structural problems are the most serious impediments to economic 
dynamism and the future long-run economic success of the country. 
 
Keywords: Japanese economy, Stagnation, FDI, Productivity, Industrial policy, 
Export-led-growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Japan has experienced a severe economic recession since the early 1990s, despite a short 
lived recovery in between, is one of the most significant developments in the recent history of 
capitalism. In this article I will examine critically the reasons behind Japanese economic 
recession and this seems to be connected with the process of oligopolistic accumulation. I 
mean the current Japanese crisis is an over production crisis and largely due to the structural 
propensity to build productive capacity while experiencing a decline in effective demand. 
The levels of effective demand depend on Keiretsu (Note 1), which determines the degree of 
utilization of productive capacity and levels of profits. At present exports and government 
spending is playing a crucial role in maintaining the levels of effective demand.  
I find that neoliberal economists have largely blamed the active state and lack competitive 
environment for the on-going recession in Japan. However, I will argue here that falling 
domestic demand and a decline in income of the average working people is the main cause of 
the current recession. The domestic market itself is unable to provide markets for goods as 
long the real wages remain stagnant and lagging behind productivity growth.  
Although my focus is about the current stagnation, but it does not mean to deny that the 
performance of Japanese economy in the last four decades, were astonishing. The country has 
gone from nearly total post war destruction to one of the richest country in the world. 
Between 1950 and 1990, the real GNP per capita rose from US$1,230 to $23,970 (both 
calculated at 1990 prices). Since 1950, average life expectancy has increased from 50 years to 
75 years for males and from 54 to 81 years for females (Crook, 1993).  By 1992, Japan’s 
economy had emerged as the main challenger to the United States as the world’s leading 
economy. The country’s export industry generated massive surpluses and the economic 
success was considered then nothing less than a miracle. However, the collapse of stock 
market boom and real estate bubble in 1991 marked the beginning of a more than a decade of 
stagnation (IMF, 2009b). 
Since 1992 due to the continuing deflation, rising government debt and unemployment Japan 
is now seen in deep economic turmoil. As a result those very institutions which were earlier 
being celebrated for their contribution (such as life time employment, state directed industrial 
polices etc.) are condemned as too rigid and less creative in 21st Century high tech globalised 
economy (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg, 2003; IMF, 2009b). The government has downgraded 
forecasts for 2009-10 despite a new financial stimulus package, in which it projected output 
to increase by 1.9%. The package forms the largest part of the US$152 billion supplementary 
budget. However, Yamakawa, chief economist at Goldman Sachs predicts a 5.3 % 
contraction in the output this year (quoted in Nakamoto, 2009:1). The exports are expected to 
fall 27.6 % this year and industrial production to decline 23.4 % (Nakamoto, 2009). 
International Monetary Fund predicts that the Japan’s real gross domestic product will 
experience sharp decline by -6.2 % by the end of in 2009 as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Asia: Real GDP (Year on year percentage change) 
 
Source: IMF.WEO data base. 
1. Change from fourth quarter of preceding year 
Note: also see Global Crisis: The Asian Context, May 2009, p. 16, IMF: Washington D.C. 
On the prevailing economic crisis, The Economist notes: “Japan’s economy stagnated in the 
1990s after its stock market and property bubbles burst, but the country’s more recent 
economic performance looks even more troubling. Industrial production plunged by 38 % in 
the year to February, to its lowest level since 1983. Real GDP fell at an annualised rate of 
12 % in the fourth quarter of the 2008, and may have declined even faster in the first three 
months of this year. The OECD forecasts that Japan’s GDP will shrink by 6.6 % in 2009 as a 
whole, wiping out all the gains from previous five years of recovery” (The Economist, 
2009:73). Japan’s economy for the last sixteen years has grown at a very slow rate i.e. less 
than 1 percent followed by high and growing public debts to GDP ratio e.g. 63 % in 1992, 
89 % in 1996, and 95 % in 1997; large and rising budget deficits as a % of GDP i.e. 0.7% in 
1990, 4.2 % in 1996, 3.2 % in 1997 (The Economist, 2009). 
The annual economic growth rate fell from average of 4.1 % in the 1980s to an average of 
just 1 % annually in 1990s as shown in Figure 1. Such a sharp decline and stagnation in 
growth rates are also termed as Japan’s “lost decade” (Kazuyuki, 2002). The country’s 
recovery of 2003-07 was largely due to the boost in export demand, but it did not have any 
long term effect on growth. Generally Japan is also seen as overtly dependent upon exports. 
During the period of 1991 to 2001, net exports contributed negligibly to the country’s GDP 
growth. Exports did surge from 11 % of GDP to 17 % in 2008. If exporter’s capital spending 
is included then net exports accounted for almost half of Japan’s total GDP growth between 
2002 and 2007 (The Economist, 2009:73). In 2008 due to the global recession and high value 
of yen, country’s export experienced a set back. Total exports have fallen by nearly half in 
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the past year. Overseas demands for cars and electronics, collapsed during the current global 
recession (The Economist, 2009).  
Figure 1: Real GDP growth of major developed economies, 1991 = 100 
 
Source: The Economist, (2009) “Japan – The Incredible Shrinking Economy”, 4th April, pp 74  
In 2002-03 a large proportion of the Japan’s recovery was due to the increased overseas 
demand, largely from China and other East Asian countries. In fiscal year 2004, its export 
increased to 11.8 % of the GDP, resulting in a 13.4 trillion yen trade surplus. The share of 
China and other East Asian countries in 2003 reached 45.5 %, thus doubling from 23.4 % in 
1984-87. During the same period, the US share declined from 37.5 % to 28.1 % (Fackler, 
2008). However, the US market is still important for the Japanese exports as it remains a 
single-country. The rapid industrialisation in China for example, has created huge markets for 
Japanese technology. A major portion of Japan’s recovery in 2003 was due to foreign 
demands, especially from the Asian countries (Giles 2009)(Note 2) It is predicted that 
international trade would decline by 9 % this year and the collapse in manufacturing exports 
will hit economies such as Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Giles, 2009; IMF, 2009). 
The fall in exports in January 2009 has widened Japan’s trade deficit to £0.8 billion, biggest 
since 1979. Japan is pleading with the trading partners to resist protectionism, a reversal of 
“Japan bashing” of 1980s, when its vast trade surpluses prompted calls to boycott products in 
the US.  
Figure 2 shows that share of world exports among the selected countries between 1990 and 
2005. The figure 2 indicates that Japan’s share of the world exports in percentage declined 
sharply during the above period, while the Chinese share increased sharply. The figure also 
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shows that the US share of world exports declined since 2000 but is still much higher than 
Japan.  
Figure 2: Share of World Exports (percentage)  
 
 
Source: also IMF.WEO data base, 2009. 
The Plaza accord in 1985 was intended to make Japanese export’ more expensive in western 
markets and import cheaper. However, it was overlooked that Japan could also try to keep 
export prices down by importing raw materials at lower prices. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF)(Note 3) along with Bank of Japan began raising the value of yen by simply 
increasing the money into circulation. The MOF advised banks to push vast amount of credits 
into an overheated economy, creating the greatest financial bubble in capitalism’s history in 
the late 1980s. 
The rising value of yen is also blamed for Japan’s recession. It is said that an appreciated yen 
reduces the competitiveness of export goods in overseas markets, thereby decreases the 
overall exports. Jeffrey Sachs (2001) has examined the appreciation of yen since 1971, 
combined with Japanese trade surplus and the expectation leading towards further 
deflationary expectations, increases the demand for cash. He says “Japan is a structural net 
savings surplus economy, in which its aging population wants to save more than its 
companies can profitably invest in Japan. The result is structural current account surplus and 
a net supply of savings to the rest of the world” (Sachs, 2001:13). Sachs argues that under 
such circumstances the households increases their savings sensing the prolong crisis.   
Itoh (2000) has divided the post-war Japan’s economic development into three periods, 
namely: (1) from 1950s to early 1970s - the high-growth period. During this period the 
average GDP growth rates were between 8-9 % per annum. (2) Early 1970s to 1990 - A 
transition period. During this period average economic growth was 4 %, which was slower 
than previous years. However, it was still higher than recession plagued US and West 
European economies, and (3) from the early 1990s - the current stagnation period, during this 
period the Japanese economy grew average less than 1 % annually (Itoh, 2000). 
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Only less than two decades ago Japanese economy was widely seen in the West as a success 
story. Its economic system was seen as unique and compatible with its state directed 
industrial policies, life time employment, low military spending etc. (Siddiqui, 1995a). While, 
on the other hand, the US and UK economic model, which was characterised as free market, 
labour flexible, shareholder’s driven and high military spending. Japanese products such as 
electronics, radios, TV, automobiles etc. became famous in overseas markets and even 
America’s top university has to acknowledge the high productivity achieved by Japan 
especially in semiconductor and auto industries (Note 4).  
During the post-war boom period the manufacturing sector played a key role in the country’s 
economic development. The rapid increase of output and productivity in this sector provided 
a boost in the export markets. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
established a successful strategy on industrial targeting in heavy industrial sectors such as 
petrochemicals, steel, machinery, cars etc. (Murphy, 2000). In Japan, most of the 
developmental policy between 1950 and 1980 was based on investment in heavy industries. 
These areas required large sunk costs and economies of scale, which acted effective barriers 
to entry. As a result a highly oligopolistic industrial structure was created known as Keiretsu 
like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo. These large businesses exhibited a very hierarchical 
pattern through a subcontracting system with a small-medium sized enterprise. This amount 
to 80 % of the total labour force, but their contribution to overall productivity is quite low i.e. 
less than half of the larger firms. During the 1960-70, the wage increase was less than 
productivity growth. During the same period the government investment in public services 
like housing, welfare, nursing homes for old people etc. was minimal, while it invested 
heavily in infrastructure such as roads, training and R&D, which further boosted corporate 
profits (Tsuru, 1993).  
The conditions of Japanese post war economic recovery came from not only the Japanese 
elite’s willingness to reignite the process of industrial accumulation, but also a very 
significant positive role played by US upsurge in military spending during the Cold war 
period. For example, the Korean War orders uplifted the whole industrial sector of the 
shattered Japanese economy (Forsberg, 2000). Furthermore a decade later Vietnam war 
helped Japan to receive further US favours both in terms of US market  and US technologies 
with a post war strategic objective of “keeping Japan on our side”, not only Communism in 
Soviet Union and China bothered American but non-aligned and neutral India was too not 
helpful to US desire (Forsberg, 2000). Therefore, the development of oligopolistic groups 
Zaibatsus were overlooked by the US as Cold War was seen more important then.  Michael 
Schaller (1985) summarised as: “The protracted effort to assure Japan access to South-east 
Asia and to isolate China trapped the United States in a ‘dead end alley’ to its own device in 
Vietnam(Note 5)”. Moreover, Japan’s relatively low military expenditure of about 1 % of the 
GDP did help its economy to invest more in new technology and infrastructure, compared to 
nearly 8-9 % of the United States (Forsberg, 2000). 
This article is organised as follows, the introduction provides an overview of the topic and the 
second section provides a critical review of some previous explanations regarding causes of 
stagnation. The third section examines the key variables, which played an important role in 
 Research in Applied Economics 
ISSN 1948-5433 
2009, Vol. 1, No. 1: E9 
www.macrothink.org/rae 7
initiating Japan’s dramatic growth between 1950 and early 1970s. And fourth section looks 
from the historical perspective and finally, fifth section examines the nature of structural 
crisis.  
2. The Causes of Stagnation 
I will examine critically various explanations given by a number of researchers regarding the 
causes of Japanese recession and these could be summarised as follows: the appreciation of 
the value of yen; a deflationary liquidity trap; interferences in the free market policies; the 
failure to clean up bankrupt companies and bad debts; and finally fall in international 
competitiveness. The first two explanations on causes of stagnating aggregate demand, while 
the rest points out towards the supply side factors. 
Japanese post war development has been characterised by the persistent of trade surplus 
leading towards accumulation of foreign reserves. The accumulation of surpluses has 
inevitably induced a secular appreciation of yen and this meant erosion of Japan’s export 
competitiveness. Japan tried to counter this with the export of capital on a large scale as yen 
could buy more dollars. Japanese big businesses accelerated exports of capital to East Asia 
and China and began to rely to a lesser extent on Bank of Japan for funds. Then the banks 
started lending money to property and estate sectors and the stock market. During the 1987 
the Bank of Japan lowered interest rates and the government followed an expansionary 
monetary policies. This excess liquidity had encouraged speculative activities in property.  
However, in 1990 the Bank of Japan raised interest rates from 3.8 % to 8.2 %, which 
triggered the financial bubble and stock prices collapsed by nearly 60 % from their peaks 
(Krugman, 1999; Koo, 2001).  
Gao (2001) explains the Japanese economic recession due to the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rate and regulated capital flows(Note 6). He concludes that 
the weak control and monitoring in Japan during the 1990s contributed to the rise of bubble 
economy. While others like Katz (1998) argues that financial bubbles and economic 
stagnation were mainly due to overregulation, inflexible, and less globally integrated 
economy(Note 7).  In fact, between the 1980 and 1990 the “bubble economy” delayed the 
full onset of stagnation. The availability of easy credits escalated stock-share, land and 
housing prices, which in turn fuelled consumer demand and also boosted the investor’s 
confidence in property as a profitable area to invest. However, it all came to an end during 
the 1990s asset value fell sharply.  
Tsuru (1993) also points out that the reasons for deepening crisis must be found into the 
dramatic growth of the financial sector. The retained profits of the manufacturing 
corporations, measured as a percentage of their gross investments, was only 59 % in the 1960, 
but increased to 75 % during the 1971, in the 1980 further increased to 109 % and while 1989 
it remained 100 % (Tsuru, 1993). It means that the supply of funds available into the hands of 
the manufacturing sector increased dramatically and could be available for speculative 
activities. This availability of large amount of capital with the corporations would also mean 
that they were less dependent on bank for credits. Therefore, the Banks was be forced to look 
for new areas to lend and here the property brokers, construction companies, stock dealers etc 
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were seen new areas to invest. And also the low interest rates further increased the demand 
for credits by these groups, thus ultimately pushing prices of the housing, land, and stocks 
prices. 
The liquidity crisis began with expansionary monetary policies initiated after 1985 Plaza 
accords, which further led to appreciation of yen in relation to dollars. The outflows of capital 
in the form of foreign direct investments (FDI) provided income in the form of repatriated 
profits and dividends, which was to be spent in domestic markets, but this did not happen. 
And Japan became a rentier nation. Koo (2001) blames the stagnation largely on private 
sector balance sheet problem. According to him, the post-bubble deflation of asset value has 
“left tens of millions of (firms and households) balance sheet all over the country 
underwater… to climb out of their negative equity position, households and companies were 
left with no choice but to refrain from consumption and investment” (Koo, 2001:2).   
Paul Krugman (1999) blames lack of demand for the continuing stagnation in Japanese 
economy. He argues that “(Japan’s) huge productive capacity remains unused because 
consumers and businesses just don’t spend enough” (Krugman, 1999:2). Krugman points out 
the issues of what he terms ‘liquidity trap’. The low interest rates combined with declining 
birth rates and lack of immigration brings the prospects of lower expected returns on capital. 
All these have reduced investment demands, while crisis deepening forced households to 
save more for rainy days. Krugman suggests that it should supplement deficits spending with 
an aggressive monetary policy and the Bank of Japan should both pump money into markets 
to undermine deflation, which will bring some inflation (Krugman, 1999:2). Krugman has 
borrowed this concept what Keynes called liquidity trap, a situation in which interest rates 
has fallen to certain level when liquidity-preference may become crucial in the sense that 
households prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low interest rates. 
On 1990s stagnation some blame the focus on Japan’s massive overhang of bad bank loans. 
According to them, thanks credit rollovers provided by the banks helps bankrupt corporations 
to continue their operations and thus prevents banks from focusing and making finance 
available to the successful and dynamic businesses. It is argued that the banks made credit 
available to big businesses regardless of profitability and as a consequence huge amounts of 
bad debts were accumulated, estimated to be more than 1 trillion US dollars (Sanger, 1998). 
The banks continued to lend to insolvent companies who simply took new loans in order to 
pay old loans. 
Another crucial factor, which was said to be contributed to the recession was seen the role of 
state. For instance, Chernow (1997) argues: “In the 1980s, it seemed that Japan evolved a 
humane, efficient variant of capitalism. The government sheltered banks and brokers from 
failures, while banks bailed out client companies and ailing competitors. Profitability was 
invariably subordinated to growth and stability. By suspending the cleansing action of the 
marketplace, the Japanese aimed to soften the rough edge of capitalism. That strategy has 
now been exposed as a destructive pipe dream”. (Chernow, 1997:A19) It was argued that the 
role of state should be minimal in economic development. According to World Bank, state 
initiative might distort market allocation of resources and as a result dampen incentives to 
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invest leading towards lower economic growth. These policies were officially recommended 
by international financial institutions as the viable option to achieve economic prosperity and 
could be summarised as: deregulation, privatisation, reliance on export markets (World Bank, 
1993). Another commentator notes: “companies with low sales don’t cut jobs; they trim 
everyone’s pay …(Japan’s) labour market is incapable of rapidly shifting large numbers of 
workers from the disappearing jobs into new ones” (Katz, 1998:A21). According to Katz, 
labour inflexibility has created a supply-side problem of low productivity growth. Hence the 
solution put forward by the neo-liberal economists is that Japan must carry out economic 
reforms along free market policies. The state should not try to direct funds, protection to the 
domestic industries to be removed and the economy has to carry out the policies of 
deregulation and liberalisation (World Bank, 1993).  
It seems that the government and business close cooperation did help the development of 
major industries, which was assisted by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI).  Johnson (1982) argues that significant role played by the MITI to bring the 
post-war economic miracle (Note 8). This means that broad set of government policy which 
promoted the specific sectors. It is often said that in the post war the government policy 
supported industries like steel, automobiles, petrochemicals and electronics. These key 
industries benefited from import restraint, subsidies, anti-trust exemption etc. The Japanese 
state has initiated and promoted development and does not conform to the liberal 
Anglo-American tradition, the legitimate functions of governments are restricted to 
administration and policing and individual freely compete against others (Francks, 1992; 
Siddiqui, 1995b). However, other western government too have distorted the allocation of 
resources, which means the government initiated to divert resources towards some particular 
sectors. For instance, the US government has supported the production and export of high 
tech weapons – including government procurements, tax credits to NASA. 
It is also being emphasised that high growth in the US in the mid-1990s was associated with 
greater risk taking, entrepreneurship and aggressive competition. For example, the Wall 
Street Journal editorial column had to say very critical words about Japan: “After having 
spanned a cottage industry of books of how Japan would “take over the world”, Japan now 
leads in few of the important industries in the late 20th century” (Wall Street Journal editorial 
column, 1997).  
Japan’s post war growth was dependent on foreign markets, especially the United States. 
Largely due the increasing export demand, the export industries witnessed over all rising 
capital investment earlier in light industries but later on in heavy industries. Japan’s economic 
difficulties are also associated with the long term movement of capitalist economies and the 
pursuits of policies of globalisation in 1980s, which led to the shift in cycle of capital 
accumulation from production to financial sector and also greater reliance on market forces 
(Wade, 1990).  
In the late 1980sthe increased competition in export markets from other East Asian countries 
has been widely discussed as new challenges for Japanese businesses. These countries also 
emphasised on the production of manufacturing, heavy industry and high tech areas during 
 Research in Applied Economics 
ISSN 1948-5433 
2009, Vol. 1, No. 1: E9 
www.macrothink.org/rae 10
the 1980s. Moreover, they also aimed to produce at international competitive prices for 
overseas markets. As a result, Japanese producers have witnessed rising competition from the 
other East Asian countries. As Noguchi (2000) explains that the East Asian countries moving 
“into the fields of high technology and heavy industry….undercut the dynamism of Japan’s 
mass production industries, just when the information and communications revolution 
centred in the United States was undercutting the viability of Japan’s system from the 
opposite end of the technology spectrum. The result (was) a lost decade for Japan” (Noguchi 
(2000:1-2). 
It is argued that the anti-monopoly law in Japan is quite weak and does nothing to impede the 
formation of cartels. Noland (1993) explains that without the government industrial policy 
Japan would have been net importer rather than exporter of automobiles, iron and steel, 
chemical products, electronics. Krugman (1987) studied Japan’s industrial policy especially 
towards steel industry. His study covers the periods of 1950 to 1971, when government 
provided subsidised credits and tax exemption to steel industries. However, their average 
combined rate of returns on its assets was well below the average of other industries such as 
manufacturing. Credits were allocated through bureaucratic criteria, rather than market 
driven.  
During the last fifteen years the idea of a “New Economy” was put forward as to be 
transforming the US economy. This consists of those sectors which are closely associated 
with the revolution of information technologies including computers, software, fibre optics, 
internet etc. The “New Economy” idea was presented by Alan Greenspan, the US Federal 
Reserve Chairman, as to bring the structural changes: “it is the proliferation of information 
technology throughout the economy that makes the current period appear so different from 
preceding decades… One result of the more-rapid pace of IT innovation has been a visible 
acceleration of the process that noted economist Joseph Schumpeter many years ago termed 
‘creative destructive’ – the continuous shift in which emerging technologies push out the 
old. … Computer modelling, for example, has dramatically reduced the time and cost 
required to design items ranging from motor vehicles to commercial airliners to skyscrapers” 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/). The New Economy has also been associated with 
globalisation and non-unionised and flexible labour force. However, in the US this 
technological revolution finds more than three-quarters of its business demand in service 
sectors such as finance, health, retail sectors of the economy. And there is little evidence that 
the IT technology has induced long-term growth. For example, in US the annual average 
productivity growth increased from 1.42 % during the 1972 to 1995 to average 2.75 % 
between 1995 and 1999(Note 9).  
The neoliberal economists point out the reasons for stagnation in Japan on alleged 
inefficiency and declining competitiveness compared to United States. For example, the 
Japanese labour productivity in manufacturing average growth was 2.9 % between1983-92, 
while 3 % in the US the same period. However, for the period of 1993-2001 it increased only 
1.9 % average for Japan, while 3.7 % for the US. It indicates that Japan did witness a decline 
in labour productivity growth. However, if we add individual years then perhaps the 
differences are less sharp and the decline might be due to falling demand might have led to 
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lower capacity utilization and hence reduced labour productivity growth. This perspective 
relies on monetarism, which finds inflation, particularly wage related inflation, as the primary 
cause of economic crisis (Wall Street Journal, 1997; Landefeld et al, 2000; Murphy, 2000).  
Some researchers have blamed Japanese recession primarily due to its businesses lagging 
behind with other major competitors such as US and EU. They blame the fall in international 
competitiveness and productivity as prime factor contributing towards recession in Japan. 
According to them, Japanese businesses were lagging behind in international competitiveness 
and productivity compare to other major rival economies such as US and EU especially since 
1990s (Landefeld et al, 2000; Murphy, 2000). Competitiveness focuses on the degree of 
competitive advantage of a firm and the degree of competition in the industry. It is important 
to briefly examine here Porter’s model. Michael Porter’s corporate analysis (1990) discusses 
the competitive advantage of nations on the basis of four factors namely: 1) structure in the 
industry, 2) firm strategy, 3) factors conditions i.e. the environment in which the industry is 
located. And finally, 4) demand conditions i.e. the market conditions for the particular 
industry. However, there are a number of opinions about on the nature of competitiveness and 
the various structural factors affecting country’s economic performance. A Swiss based 
business school, namely International Institute for Management Development (IMD), 
examines data on international competitiveness of various countries, which presents as the 
basis for quantitative analysis of global competitiveness indexes.  
The Institute for Management Development’s annual World Competitiveness Yearbook on 
competitive rankings are based on vast amount of primary data which consist of around 250 
variables, which includes data on economic size, investment in new technology, financial 
market size etc. and opinions from corporate executives from the multinational corporations. 
For instance, its annual World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 puts Japan’s competitiveness 
at 30th place out of 49 countries. Japan’s competitiveness has declined in compare to 26th 
position it had in 2001. In 2002, the country ranked 29th out of 49 countries regarding 
economic performance, which was listed 16th in 2001. In addition to that 1990s witnessed 
intensifying competition due to globalisation and the development in information technology 
(IT) old business models are becoming less attractive in fast changing environment 
(Kazuyuki, 2002).  
The neoliberal economists uncritically accept capitalist relations, and this seems to be major 
weaknesses of such findings. However, our critical analysis suggests that all these perspective 
may have had some implications and contributed towards this on-going crisis, but crucial 
facts are that the country faces a crisis of capitalist maturity involving in widening income 
gap between the workers and the owners of capital and also wasteful utilisation of both 
natural and human resources. I will discuss these points in detail later on in this article.  
3. Japanese Growth Miracle 
Japanese economy grew very fast and doubled in size every seven years between the periods 
of 1950 to 1973. Japan had achieved one of the highest per capita incomes among the 
developed countries and their multinational corporations had become globally known. Also 
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many East Asian countries (Kosai, 1986). With the beginning of Korean War in 1950, the US 
purchase of goods for its soldier from Japan boosted its economy. During 1950 and 1973, the 
Japan’s GDP grew at 10 % per annum. The country witnessed rapid expansion of heavy 
industry such as chemical, iron and steel, ship building, automobiles etc. By early 1970s, 
Japans real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms stood at 59 % of the US level, 
compared with 17 % in 1950. In barely one generation Japan had closed much of its gap in 
output and incomes with the rest of the developed countries (Blomstrom et al, 2001:3). 
Moreover, Japan was also able to maintain very high rate of domestic savings rate i.e. 30 % 
of the GDP in the 1960s. High domestic savings along with favourable macroeconomic 
policies that kept inflation low. 
After the Second World War Japan was nearly seven years under the US occupation army 
and its government became completely subordinate to the occupying force. During this 
period US drafted constitution, promoted worker unions, parliamentary democracy, dissolved 
Zaibatsu business conglomerate and initiated land reforms. The US saw the big landholders 
and zaibatsu responsible for turning the country towards military adventurism (Schaller, 
1985).   
Therefore, the United States supported land reform measures, which aimed besides 
undermining the power of big landholders, also to control land rents and land sales price to 
benefit tenant farmers. As a consequence, the cultivators-tenants were paying landlords only 
about one-sixth of the monetary value at producer prices of the corresponding shares of their 
crops (Flath, 2000: 73-74). Later on in 1946, government banned absentee landlordism and 
replaced strictly with resident cultivators residing in close proximity. The surplus lands were 
sold to tenant not on market prices but at much lower prices. In 1952 land law put severe 
restrictions on land ownership and land use. For example, under the new law, anyone 
household the combined ownership of agriculture land could not exceed the limit set by land 
reform law. Some called this measure outright confiscation of land. As a result, the share 
tenancy was drastically curtailed(Note 10). For example, in 1946 nearly half of the 
agricultural land was cultivated by tenants rather than by owners, but the situation changed 
dramatically and in 1955 only one-tenth of the agricultural land was cultivated by tenants 
(Redford, 1978). 
Manufacturing industries also played an important role in the growth of Japanese economy. 
The manufacturing industries’ cumulative increase in output and productivity was benefited 
by the expanding overseas markets. The government control banks provided state officials 
full control over investment decisions. At the same time government put restrictions of 
domestic firms raising capital from foreign sources. Competition was effectively regulated 
through official guidance in which government encouraged the cross ownership shares 
between banks and Keiretsu (Johnson, 1982). 
The government consciously assigned the state to actively direct to build the industrial base 
after the country was forced to re-open its commercial relations with West in 1868. This 
policy continued even after the 2nd World War and the government used all available 
resources to achieve high economic growth (Johnson, 1982).  According to Johnson (1982) 
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to achieve high growth, the government promoted and protected the interest of big 
corporations. He argues that the close cooperation between government and business of 
which leading architects was MITI, despite the disaster of War and occupation, the role of 
state survived in the post war period. As also Pempel and Muramatsu (1995) notes: 
“Economic development has been persistently pursued as a national goal by Japan’s business 
and political leaders since Meiji Restoration in 1668 and with renewed enthusiasm after the 
2nd World War” (Pempel and Muramatsu,1995: 34). 
The international political environment has also proved to be advantageous to Japanese 
corporate sector. During the Cold War, the United States prime concern was to encircle China 
as prop up authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes as strategic “bulwarks” in their 
struggle against the perceived threat of communism. Japan emerged as regional power to 
protect US interest. The United States lifted barriers to the transfer of technology to Japan.  
The question arises what are the sources of Japanese miracle?  The state role is crucial as to 
initiate the industrial transformation in “early stage” from import substitution to 
export-led-industrialisation. The industrial policy, as happened in Japan, was to select 
promising industries and sectors and then protecting, subsidising and making credits available 
to them. The MITI had undertaken the tasks to coordinate the industrial policies. In fact, state 
directed was not only adopted by Japan but also evidence from West European indicates that 
in early period of their industrialisation the state actively promoted and formulated policies to 
help the growth of domestic industries(Note 11). Chang (2002) finds that state intervention in 
the economy is not a peculiar that took place in Japan, but universal feature common at all 
successful economies at an early stage of their industrialisation including England and Unites 
States (Chang, 2002; Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008).  
Robert Wade (1990) point out that high rate of trade performance was largely due to impact 
of state interventionist policies that brought radical change to favour domestic industries. 
However, Rodrik (1995) argues that Japan and other East Asian countries economies grew at 
higher rates were largely due to rapid capital accumulation and investment and that growth 
had little to do with industrial policy. However, such arguments fail to answer why some East 
Asian were able to successfully mobilise their resources including labour to launch a big push 
towards setting up modern industries while others were not able to able to carry out such 
policies.   
The World Bank’s Report in on The East Asian Miracle (1993) points out the role of 
manufactured goods exports played a crucial role in stimulating the economic growth in the 
country. The Report notes: “highly effective way of enhancing absorption of international 
best practice technology (and) thus boosting productivity and output growth” (The World 
Bank, 1993: 357)(Note 12). Strong and dynamic export sector is considered an effective 
means of introducing new technologies both in exporting firms and spell over into the wider 
economy (Note 13). In contrast to the above views Porter (1990) argues that Japanese export 
success reflects the largely favourable domestic conditions. According to him in Japan highly 
competitive domestic conditions led to innovations in both products and management 
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techniques. He further says that availability of factors conditions such as human capital was 
important for the success of the country export industries.  
I will critically examine the export-led-growth and find that the spectacular growth rates of 
Japanese economy were not achieved following laissez-faire policies. On the contrary the 
country maintained a policy of high levels of protection from 1950 to 1970, when the growth 
rates was highest. Table 2 shows export growth seems to have grown steadily except in 1998 
and 2001, when it witnessed negative growths and those years also coincided with recessions. 
The increasing ratios of both exports and imports to GDP suggest that the economy during 
these periods became more reliant on trade (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2003:343). On the 
average over the last 15 years or so the increasing ratios of both exports and imports to GDP 
ratios clearly shows that its economy became more dependent on trade. Moreover, the GDP 
ratio/current account surplus seems to be influenced by exchange rate. The yen appreciation 
of 1992-95 corresponds to a reduction in the GDP ratio/the current account. And later on the 
weakening of the yen, the GDP ratio/the current account has improved as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Japan’s Trade Indicators for various years 
 Real Annual Growth 
Rates 
Ratios to GDP  
Years Exports Imports Current 
Account 
Balance 
Exports 
(fob) 
Imports 
(fob) 
Exchange 
Rate# 
1993 1.3 -0.3 3.1 8.3 5.0 111.2 
1994 3.4 7.7 2.7 8.0 5.0 102.2 
1995 4.1 12.8 2.1 8.1 5.6 94.1 
1996 6.4 13.2 1.4 8.5 6.7 108.8 
1997 11.3 1.2 2.2 9.6 7.2 121.0 
1998 -2.3 -6.8 3.0 9.6 6.4 130.9 
1999 1.3 2.9 2.5 9.1 6.3 113.9 
2000 12.1 9.9 2.5 9.8 7.3 107.8 
2001 -2.9 2.4 2.1 10.1 7.8 121.5 
Notes: # yen per US $, annual average 
Source: IMF staff country reports 
Japan holds its export earnings in dollars, rather than in yen. Also Japanese companies have 
saved its export earnings in US banks, thereby making surplus available to finance the US 
deficits. It is also buying commercial paper and corporate bonds to help the firms raise funds. 
The country’s national debt has risen to 175% of GDP (Seager, 2009). 
Japan is the second largest economy in the world and yen is undoubtedly world’s third most 
important currency. Why then Japan should behave like a developing countries economy i.e. 
hoarding “precious” foreign exchange (see Figure 3) as a safety measures when it would not 
be able to pay for essential imports? It is most likely that Japan’s trade surplus would not 
have been so large if Japan had switched from US dollar in 1970s. We should not undermine 
the importance of US market for Japanese products, pricing the products in dollars was seen 
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most attractive for the US customers. And most importantly, all Japanese East Asian trading 
countries also use the dollar as their primary external settlements and reserve currency. 
Japanese companies determined to expand their export markets, found dollar is critical to 
their global expansion and growth.  
Figure 3: East Asia – Trends in Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
Source: also quoted in Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Economy and 
Trade 2005 – overview, July 2005, p. 13 
The features of Japanese growth model as compared to Anglo-Saxon was that an economic 
system valuing social cohesion and collective goals over individualistic pursuit of personal 
welfare. Francis Fukuyama (1995) in his book “Trust” argues in favour of such Japanese 
values by emphasising the role of “social capital” and “trust” in economic development. 
Furthermore, Fukuyama explains economic development in terms of culture. According to 
him, culture plays a crucial role i.e. “Trust”, which allows businesses to grow beyond family 
into large professionally managed organisations. According to him, the degree of Trust varies 
in different societies and nations. He divides nations in groupings like “high trust nations like 
US, Japan, UK, and Germany and low trust nations like Italy, Korea, Taiwan and China.  
I find Fukuyama’s broad generalisation ignores the historical dynamism and rise of 
capitalism in the West European countries as a system of production. And how it did brought 
changes in European societies in economic organisations and culture as well. He praises 
Keiretsus Japanese oligopolistic corporations ‘as a living example of trust and sociability’ 
(Fukuyama, 1995:197). However, last decade the opening up of Japanese domestic market 
for foreign businesses has exposed the problems of bad debts and cross-subsidies. Japan’s 
businesses have serious problems of falling profitability and crisis. It simply means a policy 
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measures could be good at one period but does not necessarily so in another period. Moreover, 
the Chinese dramatic growth of the last nearly three decades also refutes Fukuyama’ thesis.  
4. Historical Perspective 
In 1853 the American warships forced Japan to open its markets for foreign countries after 
nearly two centuries of seclusion. It set chain of events that culminated in the 1868 Meiji 
Restoration, which also ended Tokugawa period. The Central Bank of Japan was opened in 
1885 and government took the task to promote the development of modern industries under 
the slogan Kokusan shogyo (i.e. increase production and encourage industry). Some argues 
that Japan’s success at industrialisation before World War I essentially resulted not from any 
particular strategy adopted by her government or any particular characteristics of her 
pre-industrial economy or society, but rather from the lack of interest of the Western power in 
incorporating Japan, as a dependent economy (ITO, 1992). The appearance of foreign ships 
and the forced opening-up to trade without protection of import barriers certainly created 
immediate crisis then, however, the foreign interest in Japan compared to China and other 
Asian nations was limited. Moreover, foreign capital played little part in Japan’s economic 
development and foreign business managed very few incursions into the domestic economy.  
Japan’s commitment to modernise its economy began with the Meiji Restoration of 1868 
which represent a highly significant break with the past. The land tax was there major source 
of revenue and the Meiji government did not borrow a very significant proportion of revenue 
from foreign sources.  The government set up clear goals to catch up with the West in terms 
of economic development. In order to achieve this, the state created institutions who were to 
supply increased number of educated and technical workforce towards the development of 
modern industry and building up infrastructure (Ito, 1992; Tsuru, 1993).  
Japan was not colonised, which was experienced by most of the other Asian countries. 
Between 1860 and 1940, Japanese economy was transferred from dominance of agriculture 
and handicrafts and small amount of trade with the outside world towards semi-industrialised 
one, producing capital goods for war requirements and expanding enclave of modern 
industrial technology. It is widely argued that Japanese economic development was largely 
due active role of the state (Johnson, 1982). Modern industrial growth has been initiated 
‘from above’ and the story of development process frequently set in terms of government 
actions, which started from Meiji restoration, for example, promotion of the development of 
modern industries, better infrastructure, educational system, adoption of modern technology. 
The government policy was clearly had a purpose to boost defence production as the country 
mainly focused on ship building, railways, iron and steel production. It is said that industrial 
policies were highly influenced by national security concerns(Note 14) At the end of 19th 
century private banks were established, but controlled by government, for the sole purpose of 
extending subsidised loans to private industries. In 1937 with the outbreak of war with China 
Japanese military succeeded in launching a clear industrial policy with strict foreign 
exchange control, provided subsidise to modern industries and protected them from foreign 
competition. Thus far most important industries in the 19th century were cotton textiles, and 
silk, where large amounts of small scale investment, especially from rural, urban trading and 
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landowning classes. Meiji period witnessed various economic reforms undertaken to achieve 
the accomplishment of modern industrial and military capacities while maintaining country’s 
independence.  
5. Mature Capitalism and Crisis 
Japan has experienced maturity crisis, which appears to be aspects of both liquidity and over 
accumulation. The liquidity crisis is due to expansionary monetary policies, which was 
initiated to undermine the impact of Plaza accord. The over accumulation crisis was largely 
due to the policies of keiretsu, who dominate the demands of the economy. In the absence of 
domestic consumption, the above both factors together led to the long term recession in the 
economy.  
The moving of surplus capital from productive to speculative activities are inherent features 
of capitalism. The mature capitalism has tendency to generate “excessive savings“, and 
economic stagnation during recession.  The inequalities are widening between employers 
and employees. The number of workers paid on hourly wage rates has increased, means they 
will work harder due job insecurity and they could afford fewer goods.  Rising inequality in 
the distribution of income between employers and employees has widened social, political 
and cultural inequalities. Thanks to this on going recession, employers have relatively more 
resources than workers. Rising inequality also threatens possible “recovery” that might 
actually begin. This is because generally employers save more and spend less of their 
incomes than employees do. The crisis ridden Japanese economy gets relative lower 
aggregate demand when income flows more to employers and less to workers. As 
government spends to “stimulate” the depressed economy, the corporate sector due to its 
policy cutting the wages to compete in global economy leave worker with less to spend, thus 
further reduces the aggregate demand.  
Moreover, the worldwide increase in the rate of exploitation cuts the proportion of total 
output that workers can afford to buy as consumption goods. The economy is therefore 
dependent on investment if all the goods produced are to be sold, and the failure of capital to 
invest creates a potentially recessionary situation that may be hidden by financial and other 
bubbles. Such bubbles arise because profits are not invested productively and instead flow, 
via the financial system, from one speculative venture to another. Each venture seems for a 
time to offer above average profits—the stock exchange and property booms of the late 1980s, 
the dotcom boom of the late 1990s, the subprime mortgage boom of 2002-6. Although none 
of these are directly productive, they can, for a period, provide a boost to spending such as 
spending by those managing the speculation, the conspicuous consumption needed to attract 
speculative funds, and so on. That leads to a short term increase in real economic output 
The highly educated workforce in China and India, for example, with far lower wages than 
the developed countries, creating an investment drain away from the developed countries. On 
global scale the capital/labour ratio is predicted to decline by a third or more (Glyn, 2005), as 
vast reserve labour in these developing countries being integrated into global economy.  As 
a result there might be further decline in the share of wages in the developed countries as 
workers find their bargaining position weakened. I find wages plays a duel role under 
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capitalism, higher wages undermines the share goes to profits and lower wages would mean 
shrinking of domestic consumers demand.  
Average wages in Japan (including bonuses and overtime pay) went down by 2.7 % between 
February 2008 and February 2009. Figure 4 indicates that the wage share in national income 
has steadily declined since 1970s in Japan. Household spending fell by 3.5 % in real terms 
over the same period. The departmental store overall sales plunged by 11.5 % within the 
same period. Although the wage share in the national income has declined in both US and EU 
countries since mid-1970s, however, this decline was much sharper in Japan compare to other 
developed countries as shown in Figure 4. I found this aspect of the Japanese development is 
largely neglected in the mainstream discussions. Since the imposition neo-liberal economic 
reforms in the developed countries the income of the working people have been cut down and 
benefits of the productivity growth was not equally shared between employees and employers. 
I find that seems to be major factor behind the lack of domestic demand and recession in 
Japanese economy. 
Figure 4: Wage share of national income (%) 
 
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris; Also IMF data and statistics. 
The stagnation continued despite large scale trade surpluses. The mainstream economist both 
Neoliberal and Keynesian with their uncritical approach to capitalist production relations 
seems to ignore the contradictions between production for profit and production for human 
needs. The deepening crisis is more clearly visible when the corporate sectors find difficulties 
in avenues to channel their surplus. However, since the late 1980s the growing role of 
financial sector in the economy with speculative activities has further worsened the problems 
of effective demands. The credit led boom aided by the financial sector also encouraged 
further investment in unproductive activities such as marketing, advertisement etc. Finally, it 
appears that mature capitalism has produced economic stagnation on the one hand and 
wasteful spending of the society productive resources on the other hand.  
6. Conclusion 
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I have analysed the factors which had contributed towards severe economic recession in 
Japan and it seems to be an over accumulation crisis. It is largely due to the structural 
propensity to build productive capacity while experiencing decline in effective demand. In 
fact, the economic growth rate fell from average of 4.1 % per year in the 1980s to an average 
just 1 % in 1990s. Such a sharp decline in growth rates were termed as Japan’s “lost decade”.  
Moreover, the total amount of public debt is 151.2 % of the GDP in 2005, which is by far the 
highest among the major developed countries. This huge state debt is the result of neoliberal 
policies of tax rate reductions for the rich and also lower tax revenue due to long period of 
economic recession.  
It has been forecasted that the Japanese population will be declining by 2010, with an 
increasingly large percentage of the population having retired from the employment. It means, 
the growth of labour will be affected as labour supply will decline, and economic growth has 
to be increasingly relied upon capital. However, the rising costs of capital will limit this, as 
currently Japanese industry faces massive over-capacity problems.  
Japanese state had played an important role in creating positive environment for businesses 
and profitability. Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan made a fast transition onto 
path of modern industrialisation. During the last quarter of the 19th century Japan copied 
modern institutions from Western Europe and US such as in banking, judiciary, police, 
education etc and modified to suit local circumstances. These reforms resulted in rising 
growth economic between 1880 and 1940 by average 3.5 % annually. Over this period, the 
Japanese economy moved from being agriculture to light manufacturing industries such as 
textiles, light industrial goods etc. (Ito, 1992).  
After the 1985 Plaza Accord with the US, the value of yen was appreciated and as 
consequence it raised the prices of Japanese products in overseas markets. However, Japan’s 
businesses found investing capital abroad more profitable due to appreciation of yen. It led to 
domestically the “scrapping of industries” in favour of off shore production(Note 15). The 
US dollar fell from 238 yen to 154 yen by June 1986. To stop further appreciation of the yen, 
the government followed monetary expansionary policies. Between 1985 and 87 the Bank of 
Japan cut down discount rate by half from 5 % to 2.5 % and also during this period the 
country also adopted to financial liberalisation policy under US pressure. As a consequence 
stock and land prices increased sharply, stimulated consumers demand and by the end of the 
1980s Japan’s trade surplus with the developed countries was to a large extent minimised.   
Therefore, Japanese businesses started relocating production units to East Asian countries. 
The rapid increase in Japanese outward investments since mid-1980s did provide new profit 
avenue to their corporations. The appreciated yen and an expansionary monetary policy 
contributed fast growth of Japanese outward FDI during 1980s and 1990s.  
Japan’s stagnation has persisted now for nearly 18 years, and the worlds’ second largest 
economy and leading net creditor is still mired in recession and there seems to be no long 
term solutions in sight.  
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During my research regarding the major cause behind the recession in Japanese economy, I 
found the issue wage share growth in national income in quite crucial, effects the levels of 
aggregate demand in country. Only relying on export to boost growth as happened in post 
war Japan is not the long term solution. As I have discussed in previous section that the share 
of wages in national income declined sharply in Japan, which seems to be the major factors 
behind the crisis. 
I found this aspect of the Japanese development is largely neglected in the neo-liberal 
discussions. Since the imposition neo-liberal economic reforms in the Japan the income of the 
working people has declined and benefits of the productivity growth was not equally shared 
between employees and employers. I find this to be major factor behind the lack of domestic 
demand and recession in Japanese economy. 
The analysis provided by neo-liberal economists about the Japanese economic crisis is flawed 
because it does not question the capitalist mode of exploitation, where intensification of 
labour exploitation goes along with increased waste of resources on unproductive activities. 
The neoliberal economists overlook the contradictions between production for profit and 
production for human needs. The crisis is clearly visible when the corporate sectors 
experience difficulties in finding productive investment avenues to channel their surplus. 
However, since the late 1980s the growing role of financial sector in the economy with 
speculative activities has further worsened the problems of effective demands. The credit led 
boom aided by the financial sector also encouraged further investment in unproductive 
activities such as speculation, advertising etc.  
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Notes 
1. The term, “Keiretsu” is defined as groups of synergistic businesses that complement one 
another naturally and dutifully. In corporate culture, keiretsu refers to a uniquely Japanese 
form of corporate organization. A keiretsu is a grouping or family of affiliated companies that 
form a tight-knit alliance to work toward each other's mutual success. The keiretsu system is 
also based on an intimate partnership between government and businesses. It can best be 
understood as the intricate web of relationships that links banks, manufacturers, suppliers, 
and distributors with the Japanese government. [Online] Available: 
http://dictionary.bnet.com/definition/keiretsu. 
2. Some view that the export-led growth was instrumental in technological transfer and 
assimilation by subcontracting, FDI, joint ventures and licensing etc. Hobday (1996) draws 
attention about the success of export-led strategies in promoting the development of modern 
industries.  
3. The Japanese Ministry of Finance is too powerful over the country’s financial institutions, 
primarily due to licensing system that accords licenses. 
4. See M.L. Dertouzos et al (1989) Made in America, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
5. On this issue for detail see M. Schaller (1985) The American Occupation of Japan, New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
6. Similar points have been put forward by N. Yukio says that “preventing the (further) 
appreciation of the yen came to be regarded as the most important objective of 
macroeconomic policy. This became the major cause of the bubble.” N. Yukio (1996:74) 
“Macroeconomic policies and asset price inflation: a political economic analysis of the 
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bubble economy”, in (Edi.) N. Yukio and K. Yamamura (1996) US-Japan Macroeconomic 
Relations and Interdependence in the 1980s, Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
7. The proponents of this view are based in United States, who idealise ‘neoliberal economic 
theory’, and on Japanese economic stagnation of the 1990s they blame overregulation, 
inflexible policies and government constraints on the market (for more detail see Katz, 1998).  
8. It is said that in Japan the government supported specific sectors/industries by “facilitating 
changes of industrial structure to keep as many high-value-added jobs in Japan as possible”, 
see C. Johnson (1992:74) “The People who invented the Mechanical Nightingale”, in C. 
Gluck and S.R. Graubard (Eds.) (1992) Showa: The Japan of Hirohito, New York: W.W. 
Norton.  
9. See analysis and estimation of the contribution of New Economy to economic growth 
made by J.S. Landefeld and B.M. Fraumeni (2000) Measuring the New Economy, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis Advisory Committee meeting, 5th January. 
10. This point is discussed in detail by Yutaka Kosai (1986) The Era of High Speed Growth: 
Notes of Post War Japanese Economy, p.21. And also see H. Kaneda (1978) “Structural 
Change and Policy Response in Japanese Agriculture after Land Reform” in L. H. Redford 
(Edi.) (1978) The Occupation of Japan; Economic Policy and Reform.  
11. For detail analysis on early British industrialisation policy, see Girdner and Siddiqui, 
2008. 
12. The emphasis on exports in general is interesting (for another example on 
export-led-growth in Central America, see Siddiqui, (1998), because in some other cases it 
voices scepticism that selective industrial policy was effective.  
13. The World Bank study (1993) argues that by making easy access to credits, industrial 
licensing, and foreign exchanges and its impact on country’s export performance. The 
Japanese government was able to create an environment that helped to achieve exceptionally 
high growth rates during 1950-1990. 
14. See the findings of R. Samuels (1994) who argues that national security concerns 
underlay Japan’s industrial policy formulations, not only in Meiji era, but also in the 20th 
century.  
15. During this new round of “scrapping” of core export industries this time in favour of 
offshore production in the late 1980s due to pressures  from the rising value of yen, failed to 
build new domestic industrial core that could provide a new source of output and 
employment growth. For example, total manufacturing employment declined from 15.7 
millions in 1992 to just 13 million in 2001 (Ito, 1996, “Japan and the Asian Economies: a 
miracle in transition”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.2:220).  
